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Abstract:
Many conservation programs,  such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP),  use indices to
select offers. When modeling how  changes in the index weights effect program outcomes, one
must account for the attributes of available land, and which landowners  chose to participate.
This paper introduces a methodology to account for changes in participation as index weights
change.  Data on the actual CRP (all offers received) are combined with an artificial population
of available lands (based on National Resources Inventory data).  Bootstrapping methods are
used to calibrate estimates of participation probability, and to account for errors-in-variables
when estimating how index scores effect this probability.  Preliminary analysis suggests that
accounting for participation  effects will effect estimated impacts of changing the CRP’s index
weights.
* Economist, Economic Research Service, USDA. The views and opinions expressed in this
paper are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Economic
Research Service or the USDA.Modeling Conservation Program Impacts: Accounting for participation using
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Introduction
Agricultural conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), often
have multiple objectives (such as reducing soil erosion, improving water quality, and enhancing
wildlife habitat).  Choosing what lands to enroll requires some method of ranking offers that will
account for more than one objective. In practice, indices are used to score and rank offer. These
indices, such as the CRP’s Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), combine measures of several
biophysical attributes of an offer (such as soil erodibility, and wildlife value of a  proposed cover
crop) with an index-weight
Given the difficulties of constructing weights that accurately represent social preferences,
in practice, index-weights are the products of technical information on physical characteristics,
input from stakeholders, and available economic insights.  It is of interest to examine how
program results would vary as these somewhat ad-hoc index-weights change? For example, are
there combinations of index-weights that greatly improve the provision of one environmental
benefit, with only small decreases in the others?
The impacts of a change in weights  will be a function of the distribution of physical
characteristics across the landscape – since each parcel of land provides a unique mix of
environmental attributes.  In addition, the impacts are a function of landowner willingness to
offer their land.
This paper considers the latter problem: how to account for changes in landowner
participation rates as index-weights change. I focus on the CRP.  The overall goal is to estimate
what the CRP would look like as the weights in its Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)
1  change.
                                                
1 An EBI score (for a particular offer) is  a vector product:
EBI = N1 *  E1 + N2 * E2  + …. + Nn * En
Where Ni  is the relative value of the i’th factor (for a particular offer),  that ranges between 0
and 1; Ei the weight for the i’th factor (it is the same for all offers). For example, the N3 factor
(soil erosion) weight is 100.  Note that Ni * Ei is referred to as the  score for the i’th factor.Using estimated probability of participation to compute an expansion factor
Estimating the first order effect of a change in EBI weights is simple: as weights change ,
the scores granted to existing offers would change, leading to a re-ranking of existing offers,
implying a that a different set of offers would be  accepted (assuming, say, that only the top X%
of offers are accepted).
However, this simple model suffers from at two sources of  “participation” bias:
a)  As the EBI weights change, it is possible that different subsets of acres (out of the currently
eligible acres) will be offered.
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b)  It is likely that the set of lands currently available are systematically different from the full
set of lands that are eligible. In particular, land currently enrolled in the CRP can not be “re-
offered”, and this land may be different than land not currently enrolled. This can lead to
biased projections of  the impacts on future enrollments (given a change in weights).
To  account for these concerns, I use a method based on augmenting current offers with offer
specific expansion factors. The expansion factor is based on an estimated, offer-specfic
probability of participation (PP).
The essential notion is that each observation in the CRP offer file is representative of a larger
set of acreage that could be offered into the CRP.  This implies that for a given offered acre,
there are other observationally equivalent acres out there. Some of these observationally
equivalent acres are already enrolled in the CRP, some were offered but were not accepted, while
others belong to landowners who have decided not to offer them to the CRP during this signup.
To compute the probability of participation, we assume that a landowners decision to offer
an acre to the CRP is influenced by an acre’s EBI scores, along with profitability and other
concerns. By modeling the probability of making an offer as a function of the EBI score (hence
as functions of EBI weights), we can estimate a new probability (of making an offer) should the
                                                
2 If landowner  transaction costs (such as the time and effort of submitting an offer  to the USDA) are non-
negligible, some landowners may not bother making an offer. In particular, landowners who judge, based on their
estimate of their EBI score, that they have a small chance of being accepted; and won’t submit an offer even if they
would like to be in the program.EBI weights change. Using this new probability (in conjunction with a probability at the status
quo), it is straightforward to derive a new expansion factor.
The expansion factor measures how many acres (across the entire nation) are represented by
an acre in an actual offer. As this expansion factor changes (due to changes in the underlying
probability of participation), so will estimates of what lands are offered to the CRP. In particular,
simulations that predict just what the CRP will look like (as index-weights change) will use the
expansion factor, along with changes in an offer’s EBI score,  when “choosing lands” to be part
of the CRP.
This simulation strategy, which augments data on existing offers with an estimated expansion
factor, can be contrasted with micro-level approaches that carefully model participation using
detailed survey instruments  on the general population (for example, Lambert et al).  Such a
micro-approach has the appeal of clarity – given that one starts with a representative  sample,
prediction is a relatively straightforward exercise. However, the leveraging of available data is
the primary advantage of this simulation approach. This leveraging is especially useful if ones
goal is to detail the correlation of environmental impacts (as index-weights change) – since the
offers provide a rich census of what the actual possible tradeoffs are.
The basic probability of participation  model
The probability of participation model uses an estimated  probability of participation  to account
for changes in the probability that a landowner will offer his land to the CRP, changes that may
be due to changes in the EBI weight vector. This is a several step process that combines data
from several sources.
1)  LTB: The USDA Farm Services Agency (FSA) likelihood-to-bid (LTB) model is used.  The
LTB model is based on NRI data. It determines which NRI points represent acres  are
eligible for the CRP, predicts EBI factor scores for these NRI points (given an EBI weight
vector), and predicts whether the land will be offered into the CRP or not.The LTB model provides a simulated “universe” of data on US agricultural lands. In
particular, the LTB can provide estimates of the acres eligible for the CRP (eligible-acres
3)
in each Major Land Resource Area (MLRA)
4.
2)  OFFER: The complete set of offers made to the CRP’s 26
h  signup form a “basis” from
which we compute the total acreage in a MLRA offered into the CRP (offered-acres). Each
offer  contains locational information as well as information on EBI scores
3)   CONTRACT: The complete set of  currently active contracts contains the same
information, per observation, as the OFFER file.
The model uses the LTB and OFFER data to compute  MLRA specific offer rates (Ormlra):
(1)  OR m = (acres offered in this MLRA)  /   (eligible acres in this MLRA).
The participation probability can then be modeled by regressing the  offer rate on  several
explanatory variables.
(2)  OR = f (X, β )
where
X is a vector of independent variables including an offer’s EBI score, measures of land
productivity, and average farmer characteristics (such as county-wide median age):
β  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated
The results of this regression can be used to generate an expansion factor is a function of  index-
weights (given an alternative vector of EBI weights):
1.  For each observation in the offer file, predict
      (3)     R O  i 0   = f (X i 0  , β ) and    R O  i 1   = f (X i 1  , β ) ;
                                                
3 Eligible acres are defined as land that meets crop history and other criteria for enrollment in the CRP, and that are
not currently enrolled in the CRP.
4 More precisely, eligible acres can be estimated for each of the  approximately 300 “MLRAS-within-state” areas.
This choice of aggregation is based on the level at which the Natiional Resource Conservation Service deems NRI
data to be “statistically reliable”.the “old” and “new” predicted offer rates.. These predictions use each offer’s attributes (such
as its EBI factor scores) and the estimated values of β .    R O  i 1, uses the alternative EBI
weight vector to compute the EBI scores for each offer, while   R O  i 0 is based on the weight
vector in place when the actual offers were made.
4)  Compute  offer specific expansion factors using:
(4)  XPi  =  R O  i 1  /    R O  i 0
Thus, if the predicted offer rate increases from 25% to 50%, then the expansion factor will
be 2.0.
5)  For each observation, the  effective acres,  EA,  is computed as:
(5) Eai = actual_acresi * XPi.
Where actual_acresi  is the actual acreage  of observation i.
6)  All the offers are sorted by EBI scores, and the “”best” offers are entered into the simulated
CRP. Note that each offer’s effective acres, rather then actual acres, is used when adding
lands to the simulated CRP.
A bootstrapping estimator
Prediction of the “offer rate” for each observation in the offer file is odd – after all, if an offer is
received, its “rate” is 1.0!  However, if one considers that each offer is representative of other
lands, lands that are already enrolled and unenrolled lands that were not offered (but are
observationally equivalent), then an “observation specific offer rate” does make sense.
As detailed above, one can use actual offers and information on the “eligible acres” data (from
the LTB dataset) to compute regional (say, county-wide) offer rates. One can
regress these regional offer rates against regional (county-average) measures of independent
variables (such as the EBI factor scores).  The notion is that this regional data will berepresentative of actual individuals, so that the coefficients from this regression can then be
applied to individual observations from the offer file.
However, aggregation bias is likely to be present, especially if non-linear functions (such as
probits) are estimated. In this case, it would be convenient to introduce other variables to help
control for aggregation bias; variables such as standard deviations, ranges, and other such
measures of the dispersion of the independent variables.
Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to use coefficients on such dispersion variables in the
prediction phase. That is, for actual observations from the offer file, there is no “dispersion”
information  -- the attribute measures are exact.
To control for this bias,  a bootstrapping estimator, I use  simulated draws from an underlying
population of landowners.  Basicallly,  a simulated dataset of “bootstrapped” observations is
generated, and used in a probit estimator.  The idea is to convert errors in the independent
variable (aggregation bias) into errors in the dependent variable (inexact measures of outcome); a
conversion that should reduce bias.
The bootstrapping estimator has several steps:
1.  For each MLRA (m), compute several non-parametric probability density functions (PDFm)
defined over a multi-variate vector of attributes (Z). This PDFm(Z) reports  what fraction of
acres (in MLRA m) are in the cohort that possesses attribute values of Z.  The details of these
probability distribution functions are discussed below.
2.  Separate PDFs for the OFFER data (PDF_0m), the CONTRACT data ((PDF_Cm) and the
eligible acres (LTB) data (PDF_Em) are generated.  Note that a separate version of each of
these functions is defined for each of the 300 “MLRA-within-state” regions. The Z- attributes
over which these functions are defined are the values of the 6 EBI factors.
3.  For each MLRA, draw (with replacement) j=1..J different bootstrap observations from the
eligible acres contained in the LTB file. The notion is to draw a representative sample of the
types of eligible land present in each MLRA.4.  For each bootstrap observation (j) from an MLRA (m), use its attributes  (Zj) to lookup two
cohort probabilities —
COHO_Oj = PDF_Om(Zj) and COHO_Ej= PDF_Em(Zj)
(for the offer and eligible cohorts respectively).
5.  Randomly assign a dependent variable value of 0 (no-offer) or 1 (offer)  to each bootstrap
observation. The probability  of a 1 will be:
  P_1j = OR m * (COHO_Oj  / COHO_Ej )
where OR m  is the actual MLRA-wide offer rate.
The idea is to adjust the  MLRA-specific offer rate, accounting for observations from cohorts
that are over (or under) represented in the “population” of offered acres (relative to the
population of eligible acres).
For example,
•  if PDF_Om(Zj) predicts that 5% of  offered acres are in COHO_Oj
•  if PDF_Em(Zj) predicts that 4% of eligible acres are in COHO_Ej
•  Then, for offers in this “cohort”< the overall MLRA probability (OR m ) will be increased
by 25% (multiplied by 1.25).
6.  Estimate  the β  coefficient vector, using a probit model applied to all these bootstrap
observations (and the randomly assigned dependent variables accomplished in step 5)
Steps 3 to 6 are  repeated R times (R=100) times to form a  R row matrix  (B) of coefficient
vectors. The average of B vectors would be the estimate of β , with a coefficient covariance
matrix also derived from the covariance of the columns of B.
Notes that the chance of a bootstrap observation (that is drawn from the LTB file) being an offer
(having a dependent variable of 1) will increase  as OR m (the overall offer rate for the MLRA)
increases. It also  increases as COHO_Oj, the (the size of the cohort of offered acres  that “look
like this bootstrap observation”)”increases relative COHO_Ej  (the size of the cohort of eligible
acres “that looks like this bootstrap observation”).Table 1 presents the Z variables, and the estimated coefficients β  , from estimating the above
model  using data from the CRP’s 26
th signup. Note that the some Z values are available at the
“offer level”, while others are derived from aggregate (MLRA-within-state, or county-wide)
measures. While most variables did not have significant impacts, the overall EBI score did, as
did the contract rate  (the fraction of lands, in a region, currently enrolled in the CRP).
Creating a non-parametric probability distribution
As discussed above, to increase the accuracy of  several components of  the model, cohorts of a
region are used. A cohort is a subpopulation, of a region, described by a vector of attributes –
each acre in the cohort will have the same value of this vector.  In a sense, to further the goal of
using small and homogeneous aggregates, we are defining regions both over physical space
(MLRAs) and “attribute space” (Z).
To do this, probability distribution functions (PDF)  are defined for each MLRA; and for each
type of data (offered acres, contracted acres, and eligible acres).  These PDFs report the
probability of observing an acre with a given vector of attributes.
One approach is to define PDFs using a multivariate normal distribution for each MLRA, with a
mean and variance computed using observed data within the MLRA.  However, although this is
straightforward, it imposes a single-peaked structure on what might be a variously peaked
distribution.
Instead, use of  a non-parametric PDFs allows greater flexibility.  In the simple case, of a single
attribute, a histogram based algorithm could be used – with the attributes divided into a finite set
of classes, and a probability computed for each class. However, when there are many attributes a
histogram method becomes difficult to implement (to avoid a crippling number of empty cells
requires unobtainable amounts of data).  Therefore, we adopt a distance based metric.
Our non-parametric, empirical PDF is defined as follows. The PDF will return a probability-
measure within a particular MLRA, for a point (P) with attributes Z.1.  Extract R: all observations in the MLRA
2.  Compute a pythagorean distance from P to each point in R, where the distance is in attribute
(Z) space.  Actually, to avoid scaling problems, the distance is in normalized Z space – the Z
values of  P and of  each point in R, are normalized by the mean and standard deviation (of
each element of Z), computed across  R.
3.  Invert these distances
4.  Take the average of these inverses.
This average is a measure of the relative probability. Hence, if P is close to the bulk of the points
in R: the average distance will be small, the average inverse  will be large, and the probability
will be large.  The use of an inverse helps control for multi-peaked distributions – points falling
near a peak (and far from another peak) will be assigned higher probabilities than points falling
in between two peaks.
Reiterating, each MLRA and each set of acres (offered, contracted, and eligible) has its own,
unique, PDF.
Note that this “probability” measure is relative.. Not only is it relative to the particular MLRA, it
is not meant to be taken as a true density function (there is no attempt to force the implied
distribution function to integrate to unity).  However, since these measures are used in ratios
(equation 5 above), absolute accuracy is not required.
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Some results
In our analysis of the effects of changing the EBI (Cattaneo et al), we created multiple
simulations. Each simulation is based on a different set of EBI weights, and yields a different set
of “lands accepted into the CRP”.  In each simulation, we computed the average value (across all
accepted lands) of factor scores; and then computed elasticies of factor scores with respect to
index-weights.Tables 2a and 2b compare the with, and without, probability of participation effects
models. No striking differences are revealed. However, the without model has somewhat smaller
elasticity values , suggesting that changes in the index-weights have a lessened impact on the
benefits  when participation effects are ignored. For example,  reductions in expected erosion
differ the most, with a 10 percent increase in the soil erosion weight leading to a 2.8 percent in
the without model, compared to a versus 3.6 percent increase in the with model.  This is not
surprising, since weight changes can induce different bids to be submitted that favor concerns
with higher weights.
                                                                                                                                                            
5 It may be more appropriate to call these functions “similarity” functions.Conclusions
In this paper we highlight how participation effects of changes in index-weights can be modeled,
and then used to simulate the CRP.  A simulation model, designed to fully leverage the data
contained in a full census of actual offers to the CRP, was devised to account for changes in
participation probability.  Preliminary empirical work suggest that accounting for such change
can have some impact on predicted results of a change in EBI weights.
While accounting for several sources of bias, the model presented above was fairly simple. A
number of issues were not discussed. These include:
•  How does land currently in the CRP differ from land not in the CRP?  Using cohort
weights, it is relatively straightforward to adjust for observable differences. More
troublesome is question of whether can one assume that currently enrolled acres are more
likely to be offered into the CRP (assuming that the CRP were to be reset to zero) then
observationally equivalent acres that are not currently enrolled. If so, using the offer file
(containing offers from a single, 2 million acre, signup) to compute offer-rates will lead
to biased predictions. In particular, offer-rates will be underpredicted for lands that tend
to have high contract rates. That is, the predicted offer rates for land most likely to be
accepted into the CRP will be too low.
Note that the CRATE variable of  Table 1 was included to partially control for this effect
– a high CRATE capturing the proclivity of landowners in that region for enrolling into
the CRP.  We also experimented with a two-stage sample selection model; with the first
stage estimating an enrollment rate (prior to a signup), and the second the probability of
offering land during a signup. However, this model didn’t reveal a correlation between
stages, although empirical evidence (from large signups in  the mid 1990’s) suggest that
most CRP landowners will re-enroll their land.
•  How will practices change as weights change.  Landowners can effect their EBI scores by
planting different cover crops. The current methodology does not allow for this – itassumes that offers are representative of a fixed pool, a pool whose attributes do not
change.
•  The CRP is not formed from a single signup. Thus, if infra marginal effects are of interest
(say, if the CRP were to be started from scratch), the dynamics of enrollment over
multiple signups may be important, since landowners have several chances to offer their
land.
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Lastly, the statistical properties of this methodology are unknown. Future work will use
controlled simulations, using artificial universes with based on a generated (hence known) set of
underlying data.
                                                
6 Note that in other work, we simulate a “full CRP”, via  a repeated simulation model, that reduces eligible acres
over the course of several signups. References:
Lambert, Dayton, Patrick Sullivan, Roger Claassen, and Linda Foreman, “Conservation-
Compatible Practices and Programs: Who Participates”. Economic Research Report (Economic
Research Service/USDA.) no. 14.  2006.
Cattaneo, Andrea, Daniel Hellerstein, Cynthia Nickerson, and Chritina Myers, “Balancing the
Multiple Objectives of Conservation Programs”. Economic Research Report (Economic
Research Service/USDA.), in press.  2006.TABLE 1: Coefficient and estimated coefficients of the probit model
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Var          Estimated beta       stderr      tstat
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constant          -2.97337        0.937   -3.17
SRR            0.000834442      0.0021        0.38
EBI_TOTA       0.00155435     0.000203       2.69
CPA             -0.091982       0.071           -1.29
AVGAGE             0.00628953       0.017             0.36
MEAN_BID    -0.000779105      0.001           -0.44
HIGH_COS     -0.0630138        0.128           -0.49
RETURNBY    -0.604321        0.478          -1.26
CRATE            0.853022        0.127           6.68
Where:
SRR  Offer’s soil rental rate (one of the EBI factors).
EBI Offer’s EBI score.
CPA 0/1 dummy if the county is in a Conservation Priority Area
HIGH_COST 0/1 dummy: 1 if the county is in a high-cost region
AVGAGE average age of proprietor in county
MEAN_BID County average of mean minimum bid acceptable to farmer  (estimated from
values generated by the LTB model)
RETURNBY county level measures of total net cash returns divided by total cropland
CRATE county level contract rate (fraction of eligible lands currently enrolled in the
CRP)Table 2a  Simulated impacts of changing EBI weights – with participation effects














Wildlife impacts 0.133 -0.015 -0.126 0.002 0.003
Water quality impacts 0.034 0.240 -0.022 -0.010 0.002
Erosion reduction
impacts -0.104 -0.039 0.362 -0.045 -0.025
Enduring benefits
impacts 0.049 -0.118 -0.262 0.324 -0.017
Air quality impacts -0.010 -0.068 -0.124 -0.016 0.040
Elasticities computed across 1000 simulations
Table 2b  Simulated impacts of changing EBI weights – without participation effects














Wildlife impacs 0.106 -0.016 -0.102 0.002 0.004
Water quality impacts 0.022 0.204 -0.019 0.002 0.010
Erosion reduction impacts -0.091 -0.034 0.282 -0.013 -0.011
Enduring benefits impacts 0.015 -0.116 -0.177 0.260 0.002
Air quality impacts -0.008 -0.055 -0.105 -0.011 0.033
Elasticities computed across 1000 simulations